This paper builds on recent conceptual work about associations that is drawn from the new institutional economics. It uses evidence from New Zealand wool broking to indicate the circumstances in which industry associations can operate effectively and in the broader public interest. Through their strong associative capacity and effective specialization of function, wool-broking industry associations developed flexible routines for managing wool auctions, mediated disputes, mitigated opportunism, addressed major market disruptions, and served as a communication channel with government. External pressures and monitoring from other business interests, governments, and a competitive wool market constrained rent-seeking behavior, preventing members from benefiting at the expense of others. 
INTRODUCTION
Associations are an alternative form of social ordering to that structured by the community, market and state, and can provide the best public interest outcomes in wool broking associations in New Zealand, focussing on their formative period and central role in the first half of the twentieth century, and provides comparisons with the Australian experience. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of some of the broader implications.
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS

Definition
Industry associations constitute third-party or bridging organisations.
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Members collectively delegate certain rights to a central body, which exercises 'associational governance' through a process of structured bargaining. Associations often represent the interests of members in an industry, but may also represent firms by size, geographic location (local and national chambers of commerce), function (importers or exporters, primary producers or manufacturers) or professional group.
Typically, they are funded by member subscriptions, and their governance is contained in a written constitution. 6 While associations come in many forms, in general they may be distinguished from a wide range of inter-firm structures by dint of their existence as a separate bridging organisation, independent of individual members, and in providing reasonably broad representation.
Associations undertake a wide range of activities in pursuit of their strategic aims. The literature divides their aims broadly into two categories: those that yield benefits to members at the expense of others ('rent-seeking'), for example by successful lobbying for favourable tax or trade treatment; and those that focus upon improved efficiency in their sector, which may also provide consequential spill over benefits beyond their membership ('pareto-optimal'). In practice, rent-seeking and efficiency motives are difficult to disentangle, for example, price and output agreements may be viewed as an exercise in market power or an attempt to provide order and certainty to the benefit of all parties. Different activities draw upon the same resources of the association, especially in terms of staff, information, and infrastructure. It may also be instructive to distinguish between motives (ex ante) and actual outcomes (ex post): a rent-seeking motive may provide unintended growth benefits as a form of externality, or vice versa in the case of setting accreditation standards that create entry barriers. 7 Motivations are also sensitive to the lifecycle stage of an association. Initial formation may draw on strategic (market power) and distributional (offloading risk) objectives; subsequently, members may perceive efficiency benefits from association.
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Doner and Schneider observe that business associations operate at a mesoorganisational level between markets and hierarchies, which has largely been overlooked by the new institutional economics. They argue that associations help to resolve many of the market imperfections that are at the crux of new institutional 7 during the interwar slump, frequently with the encouragement of governments, especially in Japan and the US, who believed they had a positive role in rationalising industries suffering from excess capacity. In Japan the number of associations rose sharply at the depth of the downturn, 1929-31, causing them to be labelled 'children of the Depression' 10 .
Contemporary analysis emphasised the rent-seeking motives of associations, particularly in the form of output and price controls, although achieving market stability and sharing technical information were also noted. 11 An initially negative view among business historians has undergone revision. Paul Sweezy's assertion of the monopoly profits generated by the Vend was challenged, along with Alfred
Chandler's framework for the supremacy of large-scale enterprise over intermediate forms of governance. 12 The multiplicity of objectives of Japanese industry associations has been brought to light, particularly their ability to complement the managerial resources of individual firms, their mediation role, and their willingness to Fleming, and Dorothy Terwiel, "How Successful was Early Australian Antitrust Legislation?
Lessons from the Associated Northern Collieries, 1906 -11," Australian Business Law Review (1999 , 27, 1. 
Associative capacity and strategic choices
The ability of industry associations to pursue particular strategies depends on their internal organisational strength and external pressures and conditions. 17 Their strength, or associative capacity, depends on the nature and benefits of membership.
High member density, or encompassment, is a central to associative capacity. Where a company never joins, or when it exits, this weakens the association's influence over the industry, its claim to speak representatively, and it risks free riding by nonmembers, and the emergence of a rival association or group. Where high density is achieved through a small number of members in a concentrated industry, this reduces the costs of administering the association, particularly in securing cooperation, participation, and honest behaviour.
The most effective way to ensure high density is to make membership of the association highly attractive. It may provide club goods, where tangible benefits accrue solely to members, such as bulk purchase discounts. The shared cost of, and access to, a common infrastructure is another possible benefit. Some services provided by associations possess public good properties, such as lobbying on behalf of the industry, although they risk collective action (free riding) behaviour by nonmember firms in the industry. These changes created a class of small-scale sheep farmers who drew on a stock and station agent in their local town for a range of business services including finance, farming inputs, and technical and market information. The volatility of wool prices, similar to most commodities, and the long lead times from shearing to final sale in London, meant farmers often relied on their agents for seasonal finance.
However, the key role of the stock and station agent was to manage the marketing of the farmer's wool, normally for sale by auction in London. A long and complex supply chain carried the wool from the farm gate to its purchaser in London, which included overland shipment within New Zealand, storage and transshipment at the nearest export port, sea carriage, receipt in London where storage, then display, preceded the auction itself. The supply chain required careful management, to minimize delays and damage, arrange appropriate insurance, negotiate shipping and storage rates, and receive payment after the sale. These responsibilities were shared between the New Zealand stock and station agent and the English importing agent or broker.
In the final two decades of the nineteenth century a major market shift commenced towards the local sale of wool in New Zealand prior to its export. The geographic diversification of demand, improved international shipping services, and the growth of the small farmer accounted for the relocation of the international wool market from Britain to New Zealand and Australia in the late nineteenth and early
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The economic development of the wool industry is detailed in Simon Ville, The Rural
Entrepreneurs. A History of the Stock and Station Agent Industry in Australia and New
Zealand (Melbourne, 2000) , 7-13. twentieth centuries. 29 Non-British buyers saw opportunities to buy directly in the producing country rather than through London as an entrepot market, a process facilitated by the growth of regular shipping services from New Zealand to European destinations. Small farmers received prompt payment and stronger market signals from local sales.
Local auctions had begun in Dunedin in the 1860s and Wellington in the following decade, although sales were small and irregular until at least the 1880s.
Local selling spread among the major ports through which wool exports passed, which also included Auckland, Christchurch, Napier, and Invercargill. Local sales were fostered by New Zealand stock and station agents who saw an opportunity to wrest control of the wool trade from larger and better-resourced British brokerage firms. The New Zealand agents thus took on the role of wool-selling brokers located in the exporting ports to auction wool prior to its overseas shipment.
Formation of wool broking associations
As more local brokers appeared, it became clear that the absence of a central auction room that could sell a substantial volume of wool imposed costs on all parties. Australian Wool Market, 1840 -1900 (Melbourne, 1958 wanted to reap economies of scale and scope, through selling related products such as skins and hides. The buyers and growers both wanted the largest offerings at any session and the most bidders.
Regional wool brokers associations, therefore, came into existence at the end of the nineteenth century, with the primary function of managing the emerging central wool auction at the major port of their region. 31 The New Zealand Wool Brokers Association (NZWBA) was formed in 1907 as the national industry body. The volume of wool sold locally in New Zealand had doubled in the first six years of the twentieth century, which reflected the continued expansion of production and the increasing share being auctioned locally. In 1906, 47 per cent of wool exports were auctioned locally, a share that rose to three-quarters by the 1920s.
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In order to continue the expansion of local selling, address the needs of major overseas buyers bidding in New Zealand, and compete effectively with the London market, brokers needed to put auction procedures on a secure footing. This meant standardising practices into routines and inculcating norms to govern behaviour.
Therefore, while each regional association managed its wool auction, NZWBA developed nationwide practices, coordinating between the associations in matters such as the national sales roster, and communicating with other industry and external bodies. Regional wool broking associations had emerged in Australia at the same time and for similar reasons. However, a national body, the National Council of Wool resolving issues with NZWBuyA persuaded Auckland and Christchurch to join.
Membership density remained high throughout NZWBA's history, bolstering its right to represent local brokers and gain access to government, while mitigating the risk of free riding on its public good role. The regional associations that were members of NZWBA in 1911 accounted for 98 per cent of the wool auctioned in New Zealand.
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Applications for membership went to an election, with three black balls to reject. In practice, there was no general attempt to limit entry, and fees were set at relatively modest levels. Membership of the regional associations was similarly small, stable, and dense. It comprised the local wool broking firms selling in the major centres (town members), and a country membership, with reduced powers and status, for local stock and station agents who regularly sold or forwarded wool at smaller inland centres.
Thus, in 1911 seven associations representing 33 local brokers and selling agents were members of NZWBA. The division between types of membership is indicated by the fact that 24 of these 33 members were selling brokers at the major ports. period between sale and removal of the wool, these were relatively isolated compared with long periods of cooperation over a wide range of issues, and were resolved through open debate and majority vote. Thus, 'voice' and 'loyalty', rather than 'exit' or 'passivity', was the order of the day, which in turn heightened the association's social capital. Boyce has similarly shown how interaction through office-holding, associational language, ceremonies and rituals helped bind group identity for the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia.
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High density and cooperation were also the products of the benefits of membership. Membership of regional associations enabled firms to participate in joint local selling, which yielded scale economies in physical infrastructure and marketing. NZWBA membership conveyed participation in the national roster of sales, thereby avoiding clashes with other regional auctions. Many of the objectives and outcomes of NZWBA discussed below were best or solely captured through membership. Active participation gave members a voice in these matters and in how the industry addressed major shifts in the external environment. Many years later, when the closely related NZSSA discussed increasing its entrance fee, it believed the new charge should reflect the substantial assets, especially goodwill, a new member gained from an association built up over 60 years. Associational mediation of bilateral disputes between members or representation in disputes with members of other associations reduced the cost and time involved in resolution. NZWBA's constitution contained instructions for dispute resolution through hearing cases at a general meeting and resolving by a majority vote of members. 50 The process was standardized, and members were well placed to judge matters that were technical and specific to the trade. While NZWBA and its regional associations could not claim to be professional associations in the manner of the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia, they would have gained some additional reputation benefits from setting standards and arranging classes for wool sorting in local technical institutes.
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Objectives and outcomes
A mixture of broad and specific objectives are stated in the constitution of NZWBA. On the one hand, it includes 'the supervision and control of all matters affecting the interests of wool brokers…selling wool in New Zealand' and a catch-all, 'to do and perform any other services'. Thus, the wide range of activities undertaken by NZWBA in practice did not exceed its original remit, and its focus was on supporting brokers selling wool in New Zealand rather than firms consigning to NZWBA actually did as an organisation, which changed over time in response to altered circumstances and through a growing appreciation of its own role and potential contribution. The minutes and correspondence of NZWBA and its regional associations provide a clearer account. These activities divide broadly into: enhancing the auction system, market regulation, and industry representation.
Enhancing the auction system
Sale by auction provided sellers and buyers with many benefits, particularly the breadth of wool choice for buyers and the prospect of many competing bidders from the sellers' perspective. In addition, it reduced the transaction and logistical costs of individual sales through centralisation and the speed of clearance through the auction bidding process. However, pushing large quantities of wool rapidly through a series of discrete processes was vital to avoid upstream hold-ups. These processes included receiving wool from individual farms into warehouses, its sorting, weighing, and display for inspection in showrooms, the conduct of the auction, the completion of sale documents, outweighing, payment, and removal to an export warehouse or shipping store for 'dumping' (compression), then delivery on board ship. Each process was more complex than might first appear, with many grounds for disagreement and dispute between buyers and sellers. Thus, there were many methods of displaying wool, incurring brokers in varying levels of work and the buyer in differing degrees of product information. Once sold, effective coordination of weighing, document signing, payment and removal of the wool were all vital, and had to be tied to changes in ownership and responsibility for insurance to avoid disputes.
External causes of outward delays such as transport movements were further complicating factors. 
Market regulation
There is no evidence in its records of NZWBA or its regional associations persistently manipulating the market by restricting the supply of wool for sale, although finding such material is always problematic. 56 Nor is there evidence of fixing the price of wool, of which their commissions were a percentage. 57 This is perhaps NZWBA members realised that collective selling might engender collective buying.
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Some regulation of the market might have been justified on efficiency grounds. Supply was highly unstable due to its reliance on the climate, while demandside volatility could be traced to two world wars and an interwar depression.
Moreover, the auction system involved substantial infrastructure costs that were fixed and asset specific in nature, thereby requiring throughput above a specified minimum level and of low variance. In this light, losses to the auction system through wool consignments to London and private sales locally threatened its viability particularly in the early years of small volumes. NZWBA acted as a powerful advocate of local auction selling in the face of opposition from London importing houses and brokers, and, locally, from some of the British and Australasian banks with substantial interests in the London market. NZWBA instructed its members not to sell privately Although they gradually came to support the idea of a futures market to mitigate price risks.
Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University, Elders N102/9. Board minutes, 1925. or consign and strongly discouraged other parties from so doing. NZWBuyA was also aware of the disadvantages of market fragmentation, and supported NZWBA in 1916
by instructing their members to boycott brokers who sold privately. 61 Extensions to the roster season were partly designed to discourage private sales between auctions.
While achieving sufficient scale, neither should individual auctions become too large, which could lead to logjams in the system and encourage growers to use alternative marketing channels. Brokers were also concerned that large individual auctions adversely affected prices and clearance rates towards the end of the sale, NZWBA's constitution detailed the types of firm that could claim a rebated commission, particularly that they held regular country auctions and generated their main income from wool commissions. By 1918, aware that this failed to mitigate the problem, it began to publish a register of bona fide forwarders. 66 The issue of rebate commissions was most difficult in relation to the banks, who, in return for providing financial support to a grower and recommending him to a particular broker, expected a rebate. The banks' size, influence, and ability to forward clips alternatively to
London gave them significant leverage with NZWBA, which negotiated with the Association of Bankers to establish a common set of rules: bank finance for the farmer had to be long term in nature and the bank had to demonstrate that it had previously shipped or forwarded the wool for several years.
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Industry representation
While NZWBA supervision of the wool market brought efficiency benefits that spilled over into related industries (such as woollen manufacturing and transportation), its advocacy role might fall more obviously into rent-seeking activity. Sweden and New Zealand, 1880 -1980 (Oxford, 1995 Similarly, the national roster required significant amendments over time, which included extending the selling season and organising separate North and South Island rosters to mitigate private sales and congestion. The scale of charges gradually became more detailed, in effect legislating and normalising a wider range of possible scenarios. Procedures for monitoring sensitive activities such as weighing and completion of sale accounts were enhanced and more clearly specified over time.
79
NZWBA's ability to modify its behaviour in line with shifts in the external environment is best indicated by its changed role between wartime, Depression, and post-war expansion as described in earlier sections. Most obviously, the centre of its attention shifted from dealing principally with the wool buyers in peacetime to working closely with the New Zealand and British governments in wartime.
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This evolution can be seen in NZWBA minutes, 1907-26, MSX 4330, MSY 4133-4136. 79 
CONCLUSION
The wool broking associations were established to facilitate the expansion of local auctions rather than for defensive motives in times of crisis. They exhibited strong associative capacity through structural (small, stable, dense and overlapping membership) and cultural (social and behavioural linkages) properties, and from the value attached to membership (operational economies and reputational benefits).
Further, their multi-tiered nature facilitated functional specialisation and learning loops, the regional associations conducting day to day auction management and providing feedback into NZWBA's strategic decision-making and coordinating role. 
